Using matched employer-employee data from eleven African countries, we investigate if there is job sorting in African labor markets. We …nd that much of the wage gap associated with education is driven by selection across occupations and …rms. This is consistent with educated workers being more e¤ective at complex tasks like labor management. In all countries the education wage gap widens rapidly at high levels of education. Most of the education wage gap at low levels of education can be explained by selection across occupations. We also …nd that the education wage gap tends to be higher for women, except in Morocco where many poorly educated women work in the export garment sector. A large proportion of the gender wage gap is explained by selection into low wage occupations and …rms.
Introduction
Much attention has been devoted to human capital and its role in development (e.g. Lucas 1993, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992) . Microeconomic studies have consistently shown that education and earnings are positively correlated, at least in activities such as manufacturing and modernized agriculture (e.g. Jamison and Lau 1982 , Knight and Sabot 1990 , Yang 1997 ).
Other individual characteristics, such as experience or gender, are often found to be correlated with wages too. Still, little remains known about how labor markets in poor countries reward schooling, experience, and other individual skills. In this paper we use micro data from eleven African countries to estimate wage gaps associated with education, gender and work experience, and ask if these gaps can be attributed to a sorting process by which individuals get allocated to di¤erent types of jobs and di¤erent types of …rms depending on their individual characteristics.
The idea that employment relationships result from a sorting process goes back a long way in economics - Roy (1951) is often taken as a starting point. One possible reason for sorting is that the returns to skills are heterogenous across jobs. Suppose, for example, that skills acquired through higher education raise productivity more in certain tasks than in others. Sorting of workers across jobs should result in highly educated individuals performing tasks in which they are more productive. Thanks to sorting, highly educated workers will be found in occupations and …rms in which they are more productive. In contrast, if education raise productivity equiproportionally in all …rms and occupations alike, there is no reason to expect highly educated workers to be sorted in speci…c …rms or occupations. A similar reasoning applies for gender and work experience. Certain …rms may require highly experienced workers, for example, and reward them accordingly. Depending on the cultural and institutional context, some jobs may be better (or worse) suited for men than women. Documenting how signi…cant is labour market sorting requires data on earnings, occupation and other worker characteristics, as well as …rm-level characteristics. Household data do not include …rm-level information and so will not be …t for purpose. Instead, we use the largest and most comprehensive matched employer-employee dataset from Africa that we are aware of, spanning eleven countries and more than 30,000 manufacturing workers. 1 Data on up to 1 Previous studies on returns to education in Africa are typically con…ned to one or a few countries, see e.g. Moll (1996) on South Africa; Canagarajah and Thomas (1997) on Ghana; Krishnan, Selassie and Dercon (1998) ten workers per …rm are available, enabling us to control for unobserved …rm e¤ects in our earnings regressions. As there is a …rm-level panel dimension in the data, we can allow these …rm-e¤ects to vary over time. Our estimated education wage gaps are interpretable as re ‡ecting the combined return to education and to the portion of unobserved ability that is correlated with education. By the same token, the gender wage gap captures possible discrimination as well as various unobserved worker characteristics correlated with gender. Our goal is to document the magnitude of such wage gaps, and assess the importance of job sorting across …rms and occupations. This is informative because it tells us where returns to ability -whether innate or acquired -are likely to be the highest. 2 Our main null hypothesis underlying the empirical analysis is that there is no sorting by education in African labor markets. To test this hypothesis, we compare earnings regressions with and without …rm and occupation controls. If the education wage gap disappears once we control for occupation, this means that sorting across occupation accounts for the education wage gap. Similarly, if the gap vanishes when we control for …rm …xed e¤ects, it implies that the gap is accounted for by sorting across …rms. In contrast, if highly educated workers are equally more productive in all …rms and occupations, the education wage gap should remain the same once we control for occupation and …rm …xed e¤ects.
The no sorting hypothesis is strongly rejected by the data. On average, for both men and women, more than half the education wage gap can be attributed to sorting across jobs and …rms. There is also a large gender wage gap in all studied countries, women earning on average less than men. A large proportion of this wage gap is explained by selection into low wage occupations and …rms. We also …nd that the education wage gap tends to be higher for women, except in Morocco where many poorly educated women work in the export garment sector.
on urban Ethiopia; Appleton, Bigsten and Manda (1999) on Kenya; Appleton (2002) on Uganda; and Söderbom, Teal, Wambugu and Kahyarara (2006) on Kenya and Tanzania. Most of these use household data.
2 Distinguishing between sorting according to observable and unobservable ability is potentially interesting but beyond the scope of the paper, which is why we do not attempt to isolate the causal e¤ect of schooling or other observable characteristics on earnings. Doing so would require controlling for unobserved abilty which is extremely di¢ cult, almost certainly requiring very di¤erent data. Worker-level panel data might be useful, but would not solve all the problems. For example, worker education seldom changes once individuals reach adulthood, making identi…cation very di¢ cult. Even if education were time-varying, one might be concerned that a change in education is itself correlated with unobserved worker heterogeneity if primarily highly motivated workers make the e¤ort of acquiring additional education. If the goal is to estimate the returns to schooling, some form of natural or real experiment would probably be useful, although it is hard to think of an approach that is both immune to endogeneity problems and practical.
One implication of these results is that the composition of di¤erent types of …rms and jobs in the economy has a major e¤ect on returns to ability and skills in Africa. In particular, it seems it is primarily the larger, more productive …rms that can put to good use the skills workers learn in school. Seen in this light, enterprise growth in Africa may be important for strengthening the incentives to invest in schooling, and for economic development more generally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework is presented in section 2. The data sources and survey methodology are presented in section 3. Regressions of earnings functions appear in Section 4, and conclusions are provided in Section 5.
Conceptual Framework
Workers with di¤erent education levels receive di¤erent wages. This is true everywhere and, as we will see, is also true in African manufacturing. There are many possible explanations for this. Most of them have to do with returns to ability. 3
Returns to ability and job sorting
There has been much debate as to whether the education wage gap represents returns to innate ability, or to skills acquired in school, or a combination of the two. Innate ability is likely to play a role because children who are smarter to start with tend to do well in school and thus acquire more education. In this paper we make no claim regarding the returns to education. What interests us is where the education wage gap comes from. To shed light on this, we decompose the education wage gap into a portion that is common to all …rms and occupations, and a portion that results from educated workers sorting themselves into better paying …rms or occupations. 3 Other possible explanations include credentialism (which can be interpreted as employers deriving utility from employing highly educated workers) and network e¤ects in rationed labor market (e.g., educated workers having better information and access to rationed high paying jobs). This is achieved by estimating four earnings regressions of the form:
where w ijt denotes the wage of worker i in …rm j at time t, S ij is the education of worker i in …rm j, H ijt denotes a vector of worker characteristics other than education, D ijt is a vector of occupational dummies and u jt is a …rm-speci…c (time-varying) e¤ect. 4 Estimating models (1) to (4) is the focus of this paper. By comparing the 's across models,
we get a sense of how much of the education wage gap is due to sorting across …rms ( 1 2 ), how much is due to sorting across occupations ( 1 4 ), and how much is due to sorting across both …rms and occupations ( 1 3 ). Under the null of no sorting/equal returns to ability across …rms and occupations, we have 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 . Our dataset contains manufacturing workers only, and so all estimated wage gaps reported in the paper should be interpreted as conditional on manufacturing employment. It may be that some of the returns to skills come from selection into the manufacturing sector, however assessing this mechanism is not possible with our data. It seems to us likely that the total (unconditional) wage gap is somewhat higher than that conditional on manufacturing employment.
Although our approach is essentially descriptive, our ultimate motivation is a better understanding of what African labor markets value in high ability workers. Investment in education has been presented to developing countries -including African countries -as the solution to their problems. The empirical evidence underlying such policy recommendations comes mostly from cross-country growth regressions (e.g. Mankiw et al. 1992 , Barro 1991 and from earnings regressions estimated using data collected at the household level (Knight and Sabot 1990 ).
Yet we know relatively little about how better educated, more able workers actually help the economy. 5 Do they raise productivity in all …rms alike? Or do they raise productivity more in certain …rms? Are high ability workers more productive in supervision than in production?
We recognize that our decomposition analysis does not identify precisely the channels through which ability a¤ects wages. But it provides useful impressionistic evidence. One possible channel is that there is complementarity between worker and …rm productivity, so that better …rms need better workers (Abowd, Kramarz, Lengermann and Perez-Duarte 2004) . If this channel is important, we expect a large proportion of the education wage gap to result from high ability workers working in high-wage …rms. To test this hypothesis, we check whether the education wage gap falls once we control for …rm productivity through u 2jt -i.e., whether 1 2 . We also recognize that, because of likely imperfections in the labour market, it will not be possible to say how much of the various wage gaps is due to an underlying productivity di¤erential between workers with di¤erent levels of education. Firm and occupation dummies may pick up productivity e¤ects, but they may also re ‡ect labour market imperfections, e.g. in the form of rent sharing.
Another possible channel, discussed for instance in Azam and Lesueur (1997) and Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) , is that literacy -and intellectual ability more generally -make workers more productive in management and supervision tasks. This is because a hierarchical organization of production requires methods (accounting, reporting, written instructions) that are best undertaken by educated, highly intelligent workers. 6 If this is the case, educated workers ought to be overrepresented in supervisory and management positions where they would earn higher wages -hence we would observe 1 4 . If both channels are at work, we expect 3 < 2 and 3 < 4 .
So far we have assumed that the education wage gap is linear in years of schooling. This may be too restrictive. Early work in this area indicated that the earnings function is concave in education. This has been interpreted as evidence that low levels of education have high returns (e.g. Psacharopoulos 1994, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002) . Much of the recent empirical 5 The idea that wage di¤erentials re ‡ect productivity di¤erentials is supported by the analysis in Jones (2001) . Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there may not always be a perfect match between wage and productivity di¤erentials, e.g. because of labor market imperfections.
6 Supervisory and management jobs also carry a lot of responsibility and may have to pay more to compensate for higher e¤ort. Firms may …nd it optimal to pay e¢ ciency wages (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984 , Sparks 1986 , Azam and Lesueur 1997 . A related possibility is that workers in skilled jobs may need to be compensated for the disa¤ection from fellow workers that they incur for taking on, say, a supervisory role. evidence, however, suggests that the earnings-education pro…le is in fact convex. 7 Aggregate growth regressions also suggest that secondary education has higher aggregate returns than primary education (Barro and Sala i Martin 1992) .
As already discussed we cannot disentangle innate ability from what is learned in school, and so we cannot establish whether returns to schooling are concave or convex. We can, however, examine which types of skills and abilities are most valuable to the manufacturing sector. Someone who has completed primary school is someone who, in spite of crowded classrooms and lack of books, is smart and determined enough to master basic literacy skills. If workers with primary education are paid more, this suggests that basic literacy skills -and the determination to learn them -are valued by manufacturing …rms. If they are not, this suggests that literacy skillsand the innate ability that they signal -are not valued. We can also ask the data whether the decomposition of the wage gap varies with the education level. For instance, if we …nd that individuals with college education are more likely to be found in managerial position, this suggests that college education -and the innate ability it signals -are valuable in managerial tasks.
To investigate these issues more in detail, we re-estimate the models in a semi-parametric fashion by letting the coe¢ cient of S ij vary with the level of schooling. To this e¤ect, we replace the S ij term in models (model 1) to (model 4) with education dummies P n n M ijn where M ijn = 1 if S ij = n, and 0 otherwise. We expect the di¤erence in schooling coe¢ cients n+1 n to be largest for those skills and abilities that are most valuable to the manufacturing sector.
The gender wage gap and job sorting
A similar approach can be used to decompose the gender wage gap. To this e¤ect, we introduce a gender dummy term G ijt in models (model 1) to (model 4). Comparing the value of the gender coe¢ cient across models tell us what proportion of the gender gap is due to sorting across occupations and across …rms. We also examine whether the schooling coe¢ cients vary 7 Kingdon and Unni (2001) report that, for urban India, returns increase with the level of education; Duraisamy (2002) …nds a similar result. Belzil and Hansen (2002) report increasing marginal returns to education in the U.S., up to grade 14. Söderbom et al. (2006) between men and women. To this e¤ect, we introduce a cross-term of the form 'S ijt G ijt . This tells us whether the gender wage gap is larger at low or high levels of education. 8 Many di¤erent explanations have been proposed to account for the gender wage gap (Altonji and Blank 1999) . One of these explanations is that women employees as a group are penalized by the emphasis many of them put on parenting and elderly care. This is because female workers are more likely to be absent from work to care for a sick child or an elderly parent. For the same reason, they also are less likely to accept to work overtime and after hours. 9 As a result, the explanation goes, men are often preferred for positions of responsibility. If this interpretation is correct, women should receive a lower return to high ability because they are less likely than men to be promoted to management or supervisory positions. Hence for them the coe¢ cient of schooling should be smaller. This also implies that when we control for sorting by occupation, the gender di¤erence in schooling coe¢ cient should disappear or at least decrease.
Another explanation for the gender wage gap is gender segregation, modeled after Becker's (1971) work on race discrimination. Underlying this explanation is the idea that, for various reasons that we need not discuss here, employers prefer a gender-homogeneous workforce, i.e., either all male or all female. The gender wage gap then arises as a result of the sorting of workers across …rms that pay di¤erent wages. If this hypothesis is true, we expect the gender wage gap to be non-existent within …rms. Consequently, the coe¢ cient of the gender dummy should disappear once we control for …rm …xed e¤ects (model 2). It is also conceivable that gender segregation varies by occupation within …rms, e.g., female typists and male drivers. If this is the cause for the gender wage gap, the coe¢ cient of the gender dummy should no longer be signi…cant once we control for occupation.
Gender segregation can a¤ect the coe¢ cient of schooling if male-dominated jobs require more schooling and ability. This occurs, for instance, if management and supervisory jobs are reserved for men while low skilled work is reserved for women. If this hypothesis is correct, the coe¢ cient of S ij in regressions not conditioning on occupation should be higher for men because they get 8 Appleton, Hoddinott and Krishnan (1999) provide a detailed analysis of the gender wage gap in Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire and Uganda, based on household data from the mid 1980s and early 1990s. Our focus is di¤erent from theirs primarily in that we concentrate on sorting mechanisms in the labour market. 9 If women cannot credibly commit never to take on parenting duties or to care for an elderly parent, they may be denied promotion even when they choose work over family. selected in higher paying occupations. In this context, the di¤erence in schooling coe¢ cients between men and women should disappear once we control for occupation.
Yet another possibility is that, in order to compete with men for better paid jobs, women must be more quali…ed than men. This can arise because employers prefer male employees and are willing to incur a cost in terms of lost productivity in order to employ them -this is the Becker (1971) 'taste for discrimination' idea. Alternatively, female workers may be victim of what Arrow (1972) called 'statistical discrimination': if the population of female workers is less productive on average or has a larger variance in unobserved ability, employers will demand higher credentials from female job applicants (Coate and Loury 1993) . In this case, women will be paid less on average but those with better credentials will be able to compete with men for better paid jobs, thereby raising the schooling coe¢ cient for female workers. In this case, controlling for occupation should narrow the gender wage gap as well as the di¤erence in schooling coe¢ cient between men and women. Investigating these various hypotheses is the object of the rest of the paper.
The Data
The data used in this paper come from a variety of surveys collected over a period spanning more than a decade. They cover two North African countries -Algeria and Morocco -and nine Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries -Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. For many of these surveys, the authors were directly involved in the design of the questionnaire, the piloting of the surveys, and/or the training of the enumerators. They are therefore quite familiar with the surveyed …rms and the strengths and weaknesses of the data.
The bulk of the data from SSA was collected as part of the Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED) organized by the World Bank. In this program, samples of approximately 200 randomly selected manufacturing …rms were interviewed in eight countries (Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). 10 The 1 0 We focus on the manufacturing sector, because most …rms in this sector are privately owned and follow a for-pro…t motive. Other sectors are less suited for an analysis of this type. In in the African public sector, for instance, the importance of political appointments, prebendalism, and oversta¢ ng has long been documented. (e.g. van der Gaag and Vijverberg 1989 , Vijverberg 1993 , Velenchik 1997a . Trade unions are also more active in the civil service and government-owned …rms than in the private sector. The likely presence of market distortions surveys started with Ghana in 1992, and most other country surveys were initiated in 1993. 11
Firms were re-interviewed three years in a row in most countries; as some …rms dropped out of the sample, they were replaced with other …rms with similar characteristics. 12 Four sectors of activity are covered: textile and garments; wood products; metal products; and food processing. Small as well as large …rms are included in the dataset. The RPED data have been extensively analyzed and have greatly improved our understanding of manufacturing in the continent (e.g. Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Söderbom, Teal and Zeufack 2004 , Mazumdar and Mazaheri 2002 , Fafchamps and Söderbom 2006 .
We augment the RPED data set with data from two other sources. First, we add data on Ethiopian manufacturing …rms that were collected independently of RPED but using a comparable questionnaire. 13 Second, we use data from the Kenyan Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (KMES), …elded in 2000 and designed as a follow-up to the last Kenyan RPED survey. 14 This survey generates data for 1998 and 1999.
In addition to our surveys from SSA, we have data from surveys in Algeria and Morocco. (Fafchamps, El Hamine & Zeufack 2002) . A sample of 860 …rms in the six main towns was randomly drawn makes it di¢ cult to interpret the correlation between education and wages. In the fast growing not-for-pro…t sector, the education wage gap is similarly di¢ cult to measure given the importance of volunteer work and the practice of hiding worker remuneration in perks and in-kind advantages (e.g. Edwards and Hulme 1995, Barr, Fafchamps and Owens 2005) . Earnings are also inherently hard to measure in self-employed agriculture, which characterizes much of Africa.
1 1 RPED or RPED-style surveys have been conducted in other African countries as well, but the worker questionnaire was not used. Consequently, we do not have matched employer-employee data for these countries.
1 2 Burundi was surveyed only once due to the rapid deterioration of the political situation following the Rwandan genocide. Cote d'Ivoire was surveyed only twice due to insu¢ cient funding.
1 3 The Ethiopian survey was coordinated by Taye Mengistae. 1 4 The KMES was organized by the Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. See Söderbom and Teal (2001) for a report based on these data. from a census of manufacturers conducted every year by the Ministry. The Moroccan survey generates data for 1998 and 1999. The Moroccan and Algerian questionnaires are very similar in spite of using two di¤erent acronyms. 15 As already mentioned, one unusual feature of all these data sets is that they contain matched employer-employee information. At the same time as the …rms were surveyed, a sample of workers was drawn from each …rm designed to cover the full range of …rm employees. The objective was to have up to 10 workers from each …rm where …rm size allowed. To increase the informational content of the data, the worker sample was strati…ed according to occupational status. 16 Each worker was interviewed individually by enumerators.
The methodology used to draw samples of workers in each …rm implies that manufacturing workers did not all have the same probability of being selected. Since at most 10 workers were interviewed in each …rm, workers in large …rms have a lower probability of being interviewed.
Moreover, within each …rm, enumerators were instructed to select workers from each occupational category. This means, for instance, that employees engaged in occupations that represent a small proportion of the workforce -such as managers and technical sta¤ -have a higher likelihood of being interviewed than skilled and unskilled workers, who constitute the bulk of the workforce. To take this into account, we assign a sampling weight to each worker based on the number of employees in the …rm and in his or her occupational category in the …rm, so as to mimic a randomly drawn sample. Unless otherwise indicated, all analysis conducted in this paper accounts for strati…cation using sampling weights.
The main characteristics of the employee sample the eleven countries covered by this paper are presented in Table 1 . To illustrate the importance of properly weighting the data, we show weighted (in bold) and unweighted (in italics) means for all workers characteristics. 17 If several years of data are available, all years are combined.
Average monthly earnings, expressed in US$, show remarkable variation across countries. The average (weighted) level of earnings in Cameroon is similar to that in Morocco, but more than …ve times higher than in Tanzania. The two CFA countries in our sample -Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire -pay higher manufacturing wages on average than the non-CFA countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The high wages paid in these two countries may re ‡ect the overvaluation of the currency at the time of the data collection (early 1990s).
Levels of schooling of the manufacturing workforce vary much less across countries than average earnings. In all the countries except Ethiopia, Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire, the average manufacturing worker has around 8 years of education -the equivalent of a junior high school degree. There is no apparent relationship between average wages and average schooling levels across countries. Manufacturing workers in Tanzania earn …ve times less than those in Morocco and Cameroon, even though they have basically the same education level on average. Moreover, Cote d'Ivoire pays higher wages although workers are less educated than in other studied countries. We also see few di¤erences in average age, experience (proxied as age minus the year the individual left school), or length of tenure across countries, one possible exception being Burundi where workers tend to be younger, less experienced and with a shorter tenure. This probably re ‡ects the small size of most manufacturing …rms in the Burundi sample.
Turning to the composition of the sample by gender, we see that women account for 10 to 27% of the manufacturing workforce in SSA but for about 50% in Morocco where they constitute the bulk of unskilled and skilled manpower in the textile and garment sectors. Men dominate high and middle management positions in all countries.
The breakdown by occupational category varies somewhat between countries in that the level of disaggregation used in the nine RPED surveys is more detailed than that used in Morocco and Algeria. We also see that correcting for strati…cation does not have a major impact on the occupational breakdown in the SSA samples but has a large e¤ect in Morocco. This is due to the fact that Moroccan …rms are larger on average than SSA …rms and use relatively less management (Fafchamps and Söderbom 2006) .
Although it is not the focus of this paper, there is a striking contrast in the proportion of production workers in the total workforce. At one extreme, production workers represent 93% of the manufacturing workforce in Morocco. In contrast, in SSA, even if we include supervisors, technicians, and maintenance sta¤, they only represent between 51% (Tanzania) to 75% (Kenya) of the workforce, with a SSA average of 66%. As shown by Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) , some of this gap is due to di¤erences in …rm size -SSA …rms tend to be smaller and smaller …rms have proportionately more non-production personnel. The rest may be due to rent sharing and labor management di¢ culties (e.g. Velenchik 1997b , Mazumdar and Mazaheri 2002 .
Econometric results
We now turn to the estimation of earnings regressions. As pointed out earlier, all regression results presented here are weighted by the size of the …rm's employment in each occupational category to correct for oversampling. We also correct standard errors for clustering and strati…cation. 18 As discussed in Section 2, we estimate four regression models of the form:
for each of the eleven countries in our sample. For Morocco and Algeria, we have large samples so that we can comfortably estimate regressions separately for each country. Sample sizes are much smaller for Sub-Saharan Africa, unfortunately. For these countries, we increase e¢ ciency by estimating pooled regressions in which the coe¢ cients of worker characteristics H ijt and occupation dummies D ijt are constrained to be the same across countries. We do, however, allow the coe¢ cients of the gender dummy G ijt , the schooling variable S ijt and their crossterm to vary across countries. We also include year-speci…c country dummies, except in the regressions controlling for …rm-year …xed e¤ects.
For Morocco and Algeria, we have information on whether the worker received vocational training from a previous employer. We include this information as a dummy variable as well as a cross-term between vocational training and gender. 19 Interpretation of the results concerning 1 8 Given the very large number of individual e¤ects in some regressions, including individual dummies is not a feasible option. Fixed e¤ect regression on suvey data is implemented by di¤erencing the data with respect to the weighted mean.
1 9 We also have information on vocation training received from the current employer. This variable, however, is subject to selection bias, training being o¤ered to very bad or very good workers, and it is ignored here. this variable follows the same principles as for education.
In addition to gender, our earnings regressions include the standard set of controls: age, work experience, job tenure, and their square. In the Morocco sample, we also include a dummy for whether the wage …gure provided by the respondent is net of taxes. In the other countries, wages are always reported net of taxes.
Detailed regression results for Sub-Saharan Africa are presented in Table 2 for models 1 to 4. Those for Morocco and Algeria are given in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. We begin by discussing the education wage gap. Education coe¢ cients have been summarized in Table 5 to facilitate comparison. We then discuss vocational training before brie ‡y commenting on the other regressors.
Education and Earnings
Education is strongly signi…cant in model (1) in all countries. Column 1 in Table 5 shows that the average education wage gap for male workers over the eleven countries is 5.9%, with a minimum of 2.7% in Ghana and a the maximum of 10.5% in Zambia. Algeria and Morocco tend to have slightly lower education wage gap than SSA. Recall that all results are interpretable as conditional on manufacturing employment. The education wage gap in the entire population is likely to higher than what we observe here, as part of the return to education may be in the form of better access to relatively well paid jobs in manufacturing, professional services, and the public sector. We observe a large gender di¤erence in the education wage gap. On average, this gap is higher for women (7.5% across all eleven countries). There is, however, a marked variation across countries. In seven of the eleven countries, the gender di¤erence in the education coe¢ cient is not signi…cant at the 10% level. In three countries, the di¤erence is signi…cant and positive: Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe (see Table 2 ). In these countries the female dummy is also negative and signi…cant, implying that women with no formal education get paid much less than men without education, and that the gender gap narrows as education increases.
Indeed, in these three countries, the gender wage gap disappears for women with 10 to 12 years of education. These results are consistent with the idea that women must be better educated in order to compete with men for better paid jobs, perhaps because of statistical discrimination.
In contrast, in Morocco, the gender di¤erence in the education wage gap is negative and strongly signi…cant. At the same time, the gender dummy is positive, indicating that women with no schooling get paid signi…cantly more than men without education. Estimated coe¢ cients indicate that above 3 years of schooling the gender wage gap becomes negative; a positive female wage gap exists only for workers with very little education. This result is consistent with the idea that female workers in Morocco are not selected for jobs that require a high level of education.
Comparing models 1 and 2 in Table 5 tells us how much of the education wage gap is due to sorting among …rms. On average across the eleven countries, the sorting of male workers across …rms accounts for less than 20% of the gap. This percentage, however, varies dramatically across countries -from a high of 74% in Ghana to a low of -14% in Zimbabwe. In all countries we can reject at the 1% level the hypothesis that 2 = 0: the positive education wage gap for male workers is not entirely due to sorting among …rms.
The picture is di¤erent for female workers. The magnitude and signi…cance of the gender dummy fall in most countries once we control for …rm …xed e¤ects. This suggests that the gender wage gap is due in large part to sorting among …rms -perhaps because of gender segregation by employers. Sorting among …rms also accounts for a larger proportion of the education wage gap for women: once we control for …rm …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient of schooling for women falls by a third on average over the eleven countries. Morocco again stands out as an exception, with the schooling coe¢ cient rising for women after we control for …rm …xed e¤ects. This means that educated women tend to work in …rms that on average pay less to their workforce. After controlling for selection among …rms, the education wage gap is very similar for men and women -4.8% versus 5.0% on average over the eleven countries. In model 2, the gender di¤erence in the education coe¢ cient is signi…cantly positive in only two countries -Algeria and Kenyawhile it is signi…cantly negative in Morocco and Burundi.
Turning to model (3) in Table 5 , we observe a further fall in the coe¢ cient on education for male and female workers. We …nd that, within the same …rm, workers in management positions receive wages that are 86% (Algeria) to 179% (Morocco) higher than those of skilled production workers, our reference category. 20 Those in middle management and administrative positions receive wages on average 25% to 82% higher than those of unskilled workers while unskilled workers are paid on average 11% to 21% less than skilled workers. In all cases, Morocco displays 2 0 Percentage di¤erence = exp(log di¤erence) -1. the strongest wage di¤erences by occupation.
Part of these wage di¤erences re ‡ect di¤erences in education, since the coe¢ cient of education in model 3 captures wages di¤erences across workers who are in similar occupations in the same …rm. On average across the eleven countries, sorting across …rms and occupations accounts for over half of the total education wage gap in manufacturing. In one country, Ghana, the coe¢ cient of schooling is no longer signi…cant, suggesting that, in that country, sorting by …rm and occupation accounts for all the education wage gap. Ghana is also the country in which the education wage gap is the lowest. In contrast, in Zimbabwe and Burundi, the schooling coe¢ cients are virtually identical whether we control for selection or not. This suggest that there are probably large di¤erence across countries regarding what mechanism drives returns to education and ability in manufacturing. It is not immediately clear what drives these di¤erences.
In Morocco, a special case in our sample as far as gender is concerned, the gender di¤erence in the education wage gap is no longer signi…cant in model 3. This is consistent with the idea that in that country the gender wage gap is due to women being con…ned to low paying …rms and occupations -mostly production workers in the textile and garment sectors.
Finally we turn to model 4 in which we control for occupation but not for …rm …xed e¤ects.
We see that, for male as well as female workers, selection among occupations accounts on average for one third of the education wage gap. Put di¤erently, one third of the wage di¤erence is achieved because educated workers tend to be selected in better paid occupations. Results also indicate that the wage premium paid to workers in management and administrative or support sta¤ positions is nearly always larger when we do not control for …rm …xed e¤ect. This suggest that …rms that hire more management and administrative or support sta¤ also pay higher wages to all workers on average. This result is consistent with the observation by Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) that larger …rms in SSA and Morocco need to motivate production workers and supervisors by paying higher wages.
We have seen that a non-negligible proportion of the education wage gap is due to sorting among …rms. To investigate whether wage di¤erences are driven by …rm size and capital-labor ratio, we regress the estimated …rm-level …xed e¤ects b u jt in the earnings regression on the log of capital and employment and sectoral dummies. The estimated model is of the form:
where b u jt is the estimated …xed e¤ect for …rm j in year t from model 2, L jt is total employment in …rm j at time t, K jt is capital stock, and M jt is a vector of sectoral and year dummies.
To save on degrees of freedom, we again pool the SSA observations but include country-year dummies.
Results are presented in Table 6 . They show that larger …rms, in terms of total employment (all regressions) and capital stock (Morocco and Algeria), pay higher wages to all workers. This is a standard result (Oi and Idson 1999) . 21 Taken together with our earlier …ndings, we see that part of the education wage gap results from the fact that better educated workers are hired by …rms that are larger and more capital intensive. We also …nd some very large sector and country dummies, suggesting that some of the wage di¤erences across …rms are related to technology.
Vocational training and earnings in Algeria and Morocco
A similar decomposition analysis can be applied to wage gaps attributable to vocational training, for which we have data only for Morocco and Algeria. To reduce the risk of endogeneity bias, we only consider vocational training received from a previous employer, not from the current employer. Since only a small proportion of surveyed workers report receiving such training, results should be treated with caution.
We …nd a large vocational training wage gap in Morocco -around 45% for men and 32% for women (Table 3 , model 1). The gender di¤erence, however, is not signi…cant -possibly because of the small number of workers who received such training. The vocation training wage gap is much lower in Algeria -2.3% for men and 4.9% for women -and insigni…cant.
By comparing models 1, 2 and 3 for Morocco, we see that, as in the case of education, around one …fth of the vocational training wage gap is due to sorting between …rms and one third to sorting across occupations. It therefore appears that returns to vocational training manifest themselves in ways similar to those of education and ability.
2 1 Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) investigate the reason for this relationship in African manufacturing.
Tenure and experience
Tables 2 to 4 also provide information regarding wage gaps due to work experience, length of tenure, and age. All of these variables enter the regressions with a quadratic term and so partial e¤ects will vary. Since these variables are used here primarily as controls, we only describe the results brie ‡y.
We begin with the relationship between wages and years of tenure, summarized in the …rst panel of Table 7 for various values of tenure. These estimates are interpretable as showing the wage-tenure relationship, holding all other factors constant, including age and general experience. Of course, as a worker gains one more year of tenure, his or her age and general experience increases by one year as well, but we ignore the latter e¤ect for the moment. In model 1 (…rst column) we …nd the usual declining marginal returns to tenure for the Sub-Saharan Africa manufacturing …rms but constant returns in Algeria and increasing returns in Morocco. This, however, arises because of a strong positive relationship between length of tenure and average …rm wage: …rms that pay better wages also retain workers longer. This is immediately apparent by comparing results for models 1 and 2: once we control for unobserved …rm heterogeneity (model 2), all three samples display the usual falling marginal e¤ects of length of tenure. The e¤ect appears strongest in Morocco which, as we have seen, also has the widest wage disparity across occupation categories. Within …rms, wage gaps attributable to tenure result from promotion across occupational categories -most commonly, from unskilled to skilled production worker. Indeed, marginal returns to tenure fall in most cases once we control for occupation (model 3).
Turning to general experience, we compute the combined wage gap associated with age and time spent in the labour market, where the latter is proxied as age minus the year the individual left school. 22 We do this by adding up the partial e¤ects of age and experience implied by the regressions, evaluated at age and experience as indicated in the second panel of Table 7, ignoring the tenure e¤ect. For example, comparing an individual in SSA aged 20 with one year of experience to someone with the same observable characteristics except he or she is aged 19 and has no work experience, the predicted wage gap is about 4% in favour of the more experienced worker. The most striking …nding here is that earnings rise much more quickly amongst the young in SSA than in Algeria and Morocco. The wage gaps in SSA take the form of selection across …rms: once we control for unobserved …rm heterogeneity, the experience wage gaps fall, suggesting that …rms that pay more on average also tend to employ older workers. One possible explanation is that …rms that pay more are those seeking to hire more workers; consequently, they are also the …rms that hire older, more experienced workers. We …nd that experience wage gaps fall once we control for occupation, a …nding consistent with the idea that, as they age, SSA workers get promoted to better paid occupational categories. The pattern is similar for Algeria and Morocco, except that wages increase more slowly with experience than for SSA.
Non-parametric estimation
The results presented so far demonstrate that a large fraction of the education wage gap arises through sorting among …rms and occupations. What these results do not clarify, however, is whether sorting a¤ects the wage gap from di¤erent levels of education di¤erently. To elucidate this point, we now turn to a non-parametric approach. In this approach, we replace the variable 'years of education' with yearly dummies and re-estimate all four models, with no education de…ned as the reference category. Estimated coe¢ cients, which indicate the log wage premium over no education, are presented graphically together with 95% con…dence intervals.
Given the smaller number of available observations for Sub-Saharan Africa, we divide the data into three sub-groups: West Africa (Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana), poor East Africa (Burundi, Ethiopia and Tanzania) and southern Africa plus Kenya (Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe). These groupings are partly based on geography, partly on levels of development.
Of the three groups, the second is by far the poorest in terms of GDP per capita while the West African countries in our sample tend to be better o¤. Results for the three groups are presented in Figures 1, 2 We focus …rst on coe¢ cient estimates from model 1. From the …gures, we see that the primary education dummies are typically not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in Sub-Saharan and Moroccan manufacturing. For Algeria we …nd positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients associated with primary education, although the e¤ect is not signi…cant for two years of primary education.
These results seem to suggest that, with the possible exception of Algeria, basic literacy and numeracy skills, by themselves, are not particularly crucial for African manufacturing. This is not entirely surprising, given that most manufacturing is concentrated in light industries like textile and garment where the use of sophisticated machinery is rare.
In the context of African labor markets, comparing illiterate workers to those with partial primary education may underestimate the return to primary education. This is because illiterate workers in manufacturing may have a high innate ability but have been deprived of a chance to go to school. In contrast, those with a small amount of primary education may have had access to school but insu¢ cient native ability to justify spending more time in school. Such a situation would generate a negative correlation between innate ability and education when comparing the two groups of workers, and this negative correlation may counterbalance the positive e¤ect of education, resulting in a zero wage gap between the two groups. Without data on innate ability we cannot investigate this possibility directly. But massive rationing out of primary education for a large proportion of children would be needed to compensate for those children who did not attend school because they were less able. In the studied countries, with the possible exception of Ethiopia, enrollment levels in primary education are reasonably high, so the rationing e¤ect is probably not strong enough to explain our results.
In contrast, the coe¢ cients of secondary and tertiary education dummies are very high in all regressions, although the shape of the curve varies across countries and speci…cations. In
Morocco, Algeria and the third SSA group (Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe - Figure 3) , the curve follows a relatively straightforward pattern, rising steadily above 8 years of schoolingand even accelerating markedly above 12 years of education in Morocco. This suggests that, in these countries, academic skills in math and English/French and high-level vocational skills are useful to the manufacturing sector. In the …rst two SSA groups (Figures 1 and 2 ) returns are high after secondary schooling, however marginal returns are very low, possibly even negative, between 8 and 12 years of education. 24
Turning to model 2, we see that in all cases the estimated earnings functions become ‡atter as a result of controlling for …rm-year …xed e¤ects. This con…rms that a large share of the education wage gap come from selection across …rms. For Algeria and Morocco, once we control for unobserved …rm heterogeneity schooling variables become non-signi…cant for up to 9 years of schooling. This means that the education wage gap at lower levels of education (primary and lower secondary) results entirely from selection across …rms. A somewhat similar result is observed in Figure 3 , albeit with up to 7 years of schooling only.
We now consider model 3. As anticipated, we note a further ‡attening in the earnings function in all regressions. This again con…rms that a proportion of the education wage gap takes the form of selection across occupations. The same general conclusion obtains if we consider model 4. We note a fall in the education wage gap at higher education levels, suggesting that selection across occupations accounts for a larger share of education wage gap among postsecondary graduates. This interpretation is con…rmed if we compare models 1 and 4. In this case, the coe¢ cients of lower education dummies remain by and large unchanged while those of higher education dummies fall. The education wage gap between 9 and 13 years of schooling (end of secondary school) thus manifest itself primarily through better chances of obtaining middle management and support sta¤ positions.
The results presented here suggest that returns to basic literacy and numeracy are not particularly strong in African manufacturing. Moreover, a large share of the wage gap at lower education levels comes from selection across …rms, in the sense that …rms paying more to all workers attract a disproportionate share of workers with some primary education. Within …rms, workers tend to be paid the same irrespective of their years of primary and lower secondary education. This suggests that lower education serves primarily as a screening mechanism: better paying …rms seem to insist on some primary education as a way of selecting high productivity workers -possibly because basic literacy and numeracy skills facilitate labor management, possibly because it signals higher ability. Conditional on being recruited in the …rm, however, primary education is not rewarded. It therefore does not appear that basic literacy and numeracy are important to the success of African manufacturing. This interpretation is con…rmed being in manufacturing. It is conceivable that completion of secondary school opens the door to civil service jobs where pay is better. Given the data at our disposal, we cannot pursue this possibility further.
by observing that Morocco, which is by far the most successful manufacturing exporter in our sample, employs many illiterate and poorly educated workers in its competitive export sector (Fafchamps 2006 ).
In contrast, basic academic skills and vocational high level skills are highly rewarded in the labor market, generating in general a convex curve with an in ‡ection point around 10-12 years of education. Furthermore, we …nd that a large share of the wage gap for higher education workers comes from selection across occupations. This suggests that higher education is valued because it imparts skills that are valuable in management and administrative positions.
Conclusion
We have estimated the education wage gap in African manufacturing using employer-employee matched data on eleven countries. Results indicate that this gap can be divided into three parts: sorting across …rms, sorting across occupations within …rms, and the rest from higher wages paid to better educated workers in the same …rm and occupation. On average across the eleven countries, sorting across …rms and jobs accounts for more than half of the education wage gap. The evidence suggests that most of the relationship between ability and earnings operates through job selection. This is an interesting …nding, particularly if …rms are using education as a signal so that more able workers are being sorted into more productive …rms. If this is the case, the potential bene…ts of education are twofold: education may have a direct e¤ect on …rm productivity by providing workers with productivity-enhancing skills; and education may have an indirect e¤ect on …rm productivity by enabling …rms to identify more able workers, thereby increasing allocative e¢ ciency.
As anticipated, we observe a signi…cant gender wage gap. Once we control for …rm heterogeneity, the magnitude and signi…cance of the gender dummy fall in most countries, suggesting that the gender wage gap is due in large part to sorting among …rms -perhaps because of gender segregation by employers. While on average the education wage gap is higher for women, in seven of the eleven countries the di¤erence is not signi…cant. In three of the remaining countries, the di¤erence is signi…cant and positive but the female dummy is negative and signi…cant:
women on average get paid less than men but the gap is lower for educated women -and even disappears for women with 10 to 12 years of education. This suggests that, while women are able to compete with men for well-paid jobs at higher levels of education, at lower levels of education women are at a disadvantage relative to men, perhaps because of statistical discrimination.
Morocco, which is the country in our sample with the largest share of female employment in manufacturing, displays a di¤erent pattern. The gender di¤erence in the education coe¢ cient is negative and strongly signi…cant while the gender dummy is positive. The net e¤ect is positive only for women with very little education. At higher levels of education, women get paid less than men. 25 Furthermore, in this country we …nd that the gender di¤erence in the education coe¢ cient is no longer signi…cant once we control for occupation and …rm heterogeneity. This is consistent with the idea that in Morocco the gender wage gap is due to women being con…ned to low paying …rms and occupations -mostly production workers in the textile and garment sectors.
The above decomposition of the education and gender wage gaps is useful for two reasons.
First, it describes the market signals sent to workers of di¤erent gender and education levels in African manufacturing. Presumably, if the education earnings gap is larger in certain …rms or occupations, educated workers will seek out those jobs. Secondly, provided we are willing to assume that earnings are correlated with productivity, the pattern of relationship between wages and education level is indicative of the way by which skills and ability raise productivity. For instance, sorting by occupation a¤ects primarily the coe¢ cient of high levels of education in the earnings regression (i.e., above 9th grade). In contrast, sorting across …rm a¤ects all education levels but, in most countries, it accounts for all the education wage gap of workers below 9th grade -i.e., workers with less than primary education are paid the same as uneducated workers in the same …rm. A similar pattern is observed for vocational training received from previous employers. These results suggest that there are …rms that require smarter and better educated workers on the shop ‡oor. These …rms pay more to all workers, which suggests that these …rms are more productive. They also tend to be larger and more capital intensive. Other …rms -especially small ones -hire workers with little or no education, many of them women, and pay them low wages.
An immediate implication of these observations is that the size distribution of …rms and the relative importance of high productivity and low productivity …rms within the manufacturing sector have a major e¤ect on returns to ability and skills. One possible interpretation is that it is only the larger, more productive …rms that can put to good use the skills workers learn in primary and lower secondary school. Alternatively, high paying …rms may rely on primary and lower secondary schooling as a screening device: relative to illiterate production workers, workers with some education are likely to have higher ability on average. We suspect that the second explanation is the correct one. Indeed, once we control for …rm heterogeneity, wages are the same for workers with or without primary education. In contrast, if low-level education raised worker productivity in high paying …rms, they would be paid more and this would show up in the education coe¢ cient.
A di¤erent pattern is observed for higher levels of education, i.e., upper secondary and postsecondary. For workers at this level of quali…cation, the education wage gap comes primarily from selection into better paid occupations, i.e., management and record keeping tasks. This is in agreement with our initial expectations: workers who are smarter and highly educated are essential to certain tasks such as labor management, record keeping, and the operation and maintenance of machinery. What the analysis suggests is that the level of education necessary for these tasks is quite high -above 9th grade. This is particularly striking because the average level of education is quite low in the studied countries, so that even low levels of education signal reasonably high ability. Compared to Africa where the overwhelming majority of the work force works in agriculture and other forms of self-employment, in developed economies a large proportion of the total labor force is engaged in labor management, record keeping, and the operation and maintenance of machinery. An extraordinarily high ability thus does not appear necessary to undertake these tasks. Putting these two observations together suggests that the skills that workers learn in high school and college are essential for management and supervision tasks.
More work is needed to ascertain the respective roles that labor management and machine operation play in …rm productivity. In particular, do educated workers raise …rm productivity because they help better manage other workers or because they help better manage the machinery? Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) examine the role of labor management in raising productivity. They conclude that labor management plays a critical and largely underestimated role. These issues deserve more research.
As a …nal remark, it is important to acknowledge that this paper has not sought to investigate whether job sorting achieves an e¢ cient allocation of workers in our samples, or whether African labor markets are more -or less -allocatively e¢ cient than labor markets elsewhere. We have taken job sorting as a given and examined the relationship between wage gaps and job sorting.
Testing whether African labor markets achieve some measure of allocative e¢ ciency would be a useful endeavor, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
